Georgia, like many other states, places workers’ compensation way down its list of legislative priorities. It is likely difficult to see any legislative “fix,” or “clarification” if an ambiguity in workers’ compensation law exists. And the task of interpretation of the law rests in the hands of judicial branch. A recent Georgia Supreme Court ruling on the interpretation of workers’ compensation statute, Fulton County Bd. of Educ. v. Thomas, marked a victory for injured workers.
In the case, the appellee-claimant was employed by Fulton County Board of Education (“District”) to operate as a bus driver. Her employment with the District only requires her to work during nine-month school year; however, her salary was paid out over a twelve-month period. During the District’s summer vacation in 2011, she supplemented her income by working for Quality Drive Away (“QDA”) as its school bus driver. When school resumed at the end of summer, she returned to her duties as a school bus driver for the District. Around October 2011, Ms. Thomas was injured while on the job with the District. Ms. Thomas timely filed for a worker’s compensation claim. The District did not contest the compensability of her claims. Nonetheless, it contested about the correct calculation of her average weekly wage.
Georgia law states, “if the injured employee have worked in the employment in which he was working at the time of the injury, whether for the same or another employer, his average weekly wage shall be the average of weekly wages earned in such employment from 13 weeks immediately preceding the injury.” Furthermore, Georgia law also recognizes the so-called “concurrent similar employment” doctrine, under which a claimant, working multiple similar jobs at the time and sustaining a compensable injury, is entitled to have her wages earned from all such jobs included in calculating her average weekly wage. In the case, the evidence reflected that the appellee-claimant worked for QDA through July 30, 2011 – first ten days of the 13-week period. However, the employer contended that the appellee-claimant’s employment with QDA ended prior to the date she sustained her injury while on job with the District, thus she was not employed concurrently at the time of her work injury.
The Supreme Court held that the term of employment refers to a particular form of work in which the claimant was engaged at the time of injury. The use of the term “employment” rather than “employer” in the statute signifies the focus on the nature of work performed rather than the identity of the employer. This principle was further reinforced by the phrase “whether for the same or another employer,” which also indicates the significance of the actual work rather than the workplace. Furthermore, the Court distinguished that the statute itself does not contain the word “concurrent.” And although the concurrent similar doctrine is still commonly applied, it DOES NOT require simultaneous employment at the time of injury. Instead, the court ruled that the doctrine in conjunction with the statute refers concurrence as the various jobs in the same line of employment that were held within the 13-week period preceding the injury. The court further explained that this construction gives effect to the legislative intent that the 13-week period provides a reliable snapshot of a claimant’s earning capacity at the time of the injury.
Here, the appellee-claimant’s work with QDA was similar in nature to that which she performed for the District, she was a bus driver. And the evidence showed that she worked for QDA through the end of summer, which was also the first ten days of the 13-week period. Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that the calculation of the claimant’s average weekly wages must include wages earned by the claimant for work performed for other employers in the same line of employment during the 13 weeks preceding the injury, regardless of the employer’s identity. And in Ms. Thomas’s case, the wages she earned from her employment with QDA would be included in the calculation.
The workers’ compensation law today has too many ambiguities and loopholes that are awaiting to be fixed. Injured workers could have a long and unpredictable path to their rights. However, the new recent Georgia Supreme Court ruling proves that though it could be a long road, injured workers can have their rights protected. And if you or a family member has been hurt at work, you must have a zealous representation to protect and fight for your rights. The Poirier Law Firm routinely, successfully represents injured works, call Poirier Law today for help and for a free consultation.